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This suit followed. The Bakers alleged, among other things, that
Massachusetts EOEA officials-namely, Trudy Coxe, Thomas French,
Jay Copeland, Patricia Huckery, Bradford Blodget, Jane Mead, Susan
Tierney, and Janet McCabe (collectively "EOEA officials") -violated
the Bakers' substantive due process and equal protection rights
("Count I"), and First Amendment rights for retaliation in the exercise
of free speech ("Count VII") by delaying the permit issuance. The
district court dismissed Count I for failure to state a claim, and granted
summary judgment concerning Count VII in favor of the EOEA
officials.
The First Circuit affirmed both decisions. Regarding Count I, due
to the nature of the governmental conduct, the court found that
substantive due process and equal protection claims regarding local
land use permits were essentially the same inquiry. The court declared
that even an arbitrary denial, absent either a gross abuse of power that
shocked the conscience, invidious discrimination, or legally irrational
action, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court
determined the Bakers' three alleged instances of official misconduct
did not breach this constitutional barrier. In each instance, the EOEA
performed a legitimate government purpose by reviewing the permit
application, and the Bakers suffered no adverse action from the
alleged misconduct.
Regarding Count VII, the court noted that delay of an application
for a land use permit in unjustifiable retaliation for expressions of
political views violated the First Amendment if a plaintiff established
three elements: (1) he engaged in protected speech; (2) he was
qualified for the permit; and (3) the delay was in retaliation for the
The First Circuit focused on only the last
disfavored speech.
requirement, as did the district court. The court acknowledged the
speech at issue involved Mr. Baker's opposition to the ACEC
legislation in the Massachusetts legislature, two years before the Bakers
However, only defendants
filed their pier permit application.
Copeland, Huckery, French, and McCabe knew of Mr. Baker's
opposition to the legislation, thereby making the evidence of
retaliatory motive insufficient. Further, the protected speech occurred
More
two years before the review of the Bakers' application.
importantly, even if Mr. Baker had made a prima facie case, Coxe had
a nonretaliatory reason for opposing the permit-the tree farm's
impact on the heronry, not the pier's impact on the heronry. The
court found the district court's reasoning appropriate, and the Bakers'
claims of errors non-meritorious. As such, the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision.
Adam B. Kehrli

FIFTH CIRCUIT
Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding groundwater quality monitoring company was not liable
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under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act as an operator, arranger, or transporter, and was not
liable for breach of warranty and negligence).
Since 1961, Defendants, Conoco, Inc. and Condea Vista Chemical
Co. ("Conoco/Vista"), have owned the Lake Charles Chemical
Complex ("Complex") in Westlake, Louisiana. In 1968, Conoco began
managing ethylene dichloride at the Complex. As a result of historic
releases and migration, the ethylene dichloride contaminated the
Complex's subsurface to a depth of twenty feet, including the
Complex's shallow groundwater zones. The Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality ("LDEQ") required Conoco to investigate and
address the ethylene dichloride contamination under state
groundwater protection laws, and federal and state solid waste laws.
LDEQ also required Conoco to install a groundwater monitoring and
assessment program pursuant to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA").
Geraghty and Miller ("G&M"), a groundwater quality monitoring
company, entered into a contract with Conoco, and Vista as a thirdparty beneficiary, under which G&M was to assess contamination
beneath several suspected source areas at the Complex. G&M
installed fifty monitoring wells by July 1985.
By May 1988,
Conoco/Vista suspected potentially serious technical and physical
deficiencies in three of the monitoring wells, and expressed concern
that such deficiencies were aggravating the contamination. With
approval from LDEQ Conoco/Vista plugged and abandoned four
deficient wells in 1989. In 1990, G&M and Conoco/Vista entered into
the Groundwater Wells Interim Agreement ("Interim Agreement"),
requiring the parties to agree upon criteria to determine whether the
remaining wells were properly installed, which wells needed to be
removed, and who would bear the costs. The parties were unable to
agree on the criteria.
Thus, Conoco/Vista retained other
environmental consulting firms to continue the groundwater
assessment program. In 1993, Conoco/Vista plugged, abandoned, and
replaced the remaining G&M wells.
In 1997, G&M filed this CERCLA action seeking compensation
from Conoco/Vista for G&M's past and future response costs.
Conoco/Vista counterclaimed seeking relief under sections 107 and
113 of CERCLA. G&M dismissed its original complaint and moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Conoco/Vista's counterclaim was
time-barred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
G&M. In addition, the district court held Conoco/Vista's common law
causes of action filed in 1993 were barred by the Texas statute of
limitations. Finally, the district court held G&M was not a "covered
person" under CERCLA.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed four issues.
The issues before the court were: (1) whether the district court
erroneously entered summary judgment without giving Conoco/Vista
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notice and an opportunity to respond; (2) whether the six-year statute
of limitations barred Conoco/Vista's CERCLA contribution claim; (3)
whether G&M was liable under CERLA as an operator, arranger, or
transporter of hazardous materials; and (4) whether the district court
correctly entered summary judgment on Conoco/Vista's state
common law counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud, breach of
warranty, and negligence.
First, the court stated that although the district court erred by not
observing the notice requirements of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, consideration of summary judgment without giving
Conoco/Vista notice and hearing was harmless error. The court
declared Conoco/Vista ultimately had an opportunity to be heard on
all of the issues. In addition, the court found the district court's postsummary judgment consideration and ruling cured any procedural
defect.
Second, to determine whether the six-year statute of limitations
barred Conoco/Vista's CERCLA contribution claim, the court had to
decide whether Conoco/Vista's response actions at the Complex
constituted "remedial" or "removal." The court categorized the initial
placement of monitoring wells as removal activities. Thus, the court
concluded the statute of limitations did not bar Conoco/Vista's
counterclaim for CERCLA contribution.
In order to prevail in a CERCLA contribution action,
Conoco/Vista had to show that G&M was a "covered person" under
the statute. CERCLA's definition of a "covered person" includes
owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters of hazardous
substances. The court held G&M was a "covered person." However,
because the facts concerning the degree of G&M's control over the
monitoring wells was in dispute, the court held summary judgment
declaring G&M was not an "operator" was premature. The court
remanded the issue of whether G&M was an "arranger" to determine if
and how the hazardous waste was moved by G&M at the Complex.
The court found G&M was not liable as a "transporter" under
CERCLA, because no evidence existed to show G&M had moved the
ethylene dichloride to another facility or site.
Third, the district court found the Texas statutes of limitations
barred all of Conoco/Vista's state common law counterclaims.
Conoco/Vista asserted their claims were timely by virtue of the relation
back doctrine and the Texas discovery rule, and because the parties
agreed to toll the statutes as part of the Interim Agreement. The Fifth
Circuit, however, held the Interim Agreement was ambiguous and
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue.
The court then looked at whether the statute of limitations had
expired for each of the state law claims. The court held the Texas
statute of limitations for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
fraud was four years, and for negligence it was two years. The court
rejected Conoco/Vista's argument that the discovery rule applied, and
stated that both the four- and two-year statutes of limitations applied to
the breach of warranty and negligence claims. The court remanded
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the claims of fraud and breach of contract to the district court,
because disputed facts existed concerning when Conoco/Vista
discovered or should have discovered the injury.
Sommer Poole
Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2000)
(affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment, and holding the
Army Corps of Engineers' Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for the Mississippi River Mainline Levee Enlargement and
Berm Construction Project satisfied NEPA requirements).
Conservation groups brought this appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit after the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted Westphal's motion
for summary judgment. At issue was whether the Army Corps of
Engineers' ("Corps") Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
("SEIS") satisfied the National Environmental Policy Act's ("NEPA")
requirements for the Mississippi River Mainline Levee Enlargement
and Berm Construction Project ("Project"). NEPA required that the
SEIS adequately consider cumulative impacts, mitigation issues, and
project alternatives. The Fifth Circuit stated it must set aside any
action found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. The court determined the
SEIS did satisfy NEPA.
Under the Project, the Corps was to build and maintain 139
separate flood control measures along the Mississippi River. The
project would take thirty-three years to complete.
The Corps
completed the Project's SEIS in July 1998. The SEIS analyzed four
alternatives. The first alternative, the Nonstructural Option, required
that the government seek to reduce and reimburse for existing
damages. The second alternative, the Landside Borrow Choice,
required the Corps use a levees' landside soil for the projects. The
third alternative, the Traditional Method, required the Corps use a
levees' riverside soil. Finally, the Avoid and Minimize Plan required
the Corps to obtain either landside soil from willing sellers or use
riverside land if landside soil was not reasonably available. The Corps
selected the Avoid and Minimize alternative and further chose not to
purchase landside soil, instead using riverside land. A dispute arose
because the Mississippi River Basin Alliance and other conservation
groups (collectively, "Conservation Groups") believed the Corps
should take material from the levees' landside.
The appellate court first reviewed the Corps' cumulative impact
analysis to determine if it was arbitrary. The Conservation Groups
argued the Corps' analysis was arbitrary in that it directly contradicted
relevant evidence. Further, the Conservation Groups claimed the
Corps avoided a cumulative impacts analysis by claiming compensatory
mitigation resolved the issue. Finally, the Conservation Groups
claimed the Corps gave the impression the Project was benign, when it

